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Abstract—Shared  understanding  is  commonly  seen  as 
essential to the success of coalition operations. Anecdotal 
reports suggest that shared understanding enables coalition 
forces to coordinate their efforts in respect of mission goals, 
and shortfalls in shared understanding are frequently cited 
as the reason for poor coalition performance. In spite of this 
consensus  regarding  the  importance  of  shared 
understanding,  however,  there  are  very  few  empirical 
studies that attempt to explore shared understanding in a 
military  coalition  context.  This  paper  attempts  to  support 
future  research  efforts  into  shared  understanding  by 
proposing  a  specific  definition  for  shared  understanding 
and  identifying  a  number  of  research  challenges.  Shared 
understanding is defined as the ability of multiple agents to 
exploit  common  bodies  of  causal  knowledge  for  the 
purposes of accomplishing common (or shared) goals. This 
definition  implies  that  agents  possessing  shared 
understanding  will  be  capable  of  coordinating  their 
respective  behaviours  in  order  to  ensure  the  efficient 
realization of cognitive and behavioural objectives. We also 
identify a number of areas for future research into shared 
understanding. These include the factors that affect shared 
understanding,  the  effect  of  shared  understanding  on 
coalition performance, and the development of techniques to 
reliably  measure  and  assess  understanding  in  coalition 
environments. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Shared  understanding  emerges  as  a  construct  of 
considerable  significance  in  discussions  about  coalition 
operations.  Anecdotal  reports  suggest  that  shared 
understanding  enables  coalition  forces  to  coordinate  their 
efforts in respect of mission goals, and shortfalls in shared 
understanding  are  frequently  cited  as  the  reason  why 
coalition  forces  fail  to  realize  military  objectives  (Maj. 
Edward  Gentle,  personal  communication).  Despite  the 
apparent  importance  of  shared  understanding  to  coalition 
operations, there is little, if any, agreement as to what the 
term  ‗shared  understanding‘  actually  means.  Few  studies 
have sought to examine shared understanding in coalition 
contexts,  and  there  is  little  hard  scientific  evidence 
regarding  the  factors  that  promote  or  undermine  shared 
understanding  in  coalition  operations.  In  order  to  address 
this shortcoming, the current paper attempts to review some 
general issues and challenges associated with the analysis of 
shared  understanding  in  military  coalition  contexts.  In 
particular,  the  current  paper  attempts  to  address  the 
following specific questions: 
1)  What  is  meant  by  the  terms  ‗understanding‘  and 
‗shared understanding‘? 
2)  What is the relationship between shared understanding 
and  ostensibly  similar  constructs,  such  as  shared 
situation awareness (SSA) and shared mental models 
(SMMs)? 
3)  Do  the  notions  of  understanding  and  shared 
understanding apply to synthetic agents? Is it possible 
to have shared understanding in hybrid agent teams? 
4)  What forms of shared understanding are encountered in 
collaborative task contexts?  
5)  What are the specific research challenges that need to 
be addressed by future research efforts? 
In  line  with  these  questions,  Sections  2  and  3  propose 
definitions  for  the  notion  of  understanding  and  shared 
understanding, respectively. A key aim of these sections is 
to  distinguish  notions  of  understanding  from  related 
constructs that have been investigated in the literature, e.g. 
situation  awareness  (SA).  Section  4  tackles  the  notion  of 
machine understanding. It maintains that our definition of 
understanding is consistent with the possibility that shared 
understanding  can  be  a  feature  of  hybrid  agent  teams. 
Section  5  discusses  a  number  of  ways  in  which 
understanding  may  be  shared  or  distributed  across 
individuals.  It  also  introduces  the  notion  of  distributed 
understanding,  which  is  the  idea  that  the  realizing 
mechanisms for understanding may, at times, be distributed 
across  a  variety  of  processing  elements  and  material 
resources. Finally, Section 6 suggests a number of issues to 
be addressed by future research into shared understanding. 
2. WHAT IS UNDERSTANDING? 
In order to derive a definition of shared understanding, it is 
important  to  understand  what  we  mean  by  the  term 
‗understanding‘. The notion of understanding that we will 
countenance here owes much to Wittgenstein‘s [1] notion of 
understanding  as  a  kind  of  ability.  Understanding  for 
Wittgenstein was akin to the possession of a technique, or 
skill, hence the origin of the slogan that understanding is 
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―meaning in use‖ [1]. Our definition of understanding places 
a similar emphasis on ability: 
Understanding is an ability to exploit bodies of causal 
knowledge  (i.e.  knowledge  about  the  antecedents  and 
consequents of particular phenomena) for the purpose 
of accomplishing cognitive and behavioural goals.
1   
To understand something (e.g. a situation, action, linguistic 
utterance, and so on) is thus to be able to do things
2 that 
depend on a knowledge of causal relationships about how 
that something came to be, and what effects that something 
is  likely  to  have.  In  the  human  case,  we  suggest  that 
understanding comprises  an ability to,  inter alia, establish 
veridical
3 expectations and explanations about a variety of 
phenomena (events, situations, actions, system states and so 
forth). Such expectations and explanations are constitutive 
of understanding, we suggest, because  they represent goal-
relevant  behaviours  that  depend  on  the  exploitation  of 
bodies of (implicit or explicit
4) causal knowledge. 
Our characterization of understanding as an ability to form 
expectations and explanations aligns itself with a body of 
recent work concerning mental models  [2-4]. According to 
Rouse and Morris  [5] mental models are the ―mechanisms 
whereby humans are able to generate descriptions of system 
                                                            
1 The definition of understanding we propose is intended to serve as the 
basis for analyses of shared understanding in military coalition contexts 
(see Section 3). We make no claims about the broader applicability of the 
definition  to  other  usage  contexts.  It  may  be  that  the  definition  can 
accommodate other notions of understanding (e.g. language understanding, 
situation understanding and the understanding of intentional action), but it 
may also be the case that there are multiple types of understanding each 
requiring a separate definition. 
2 Note that our emphasis on understanding as an ability does not entail a 
commitment to distinguishing between dispositional and occurrent ‗forms‘ 
of  understanding.  To  entertain  this  view  (of  multiple  forms  of 
understanding) would be to suggest that understanding (in a dispositional 
sense) is a disposition to understand something (in the occurrent sense) if a 
suitable occasion for behavioural (e.g. linguistic) expression should arise. 
This is prohibited on our account because to understand something (e.g. a 
situation) is to be able to express behaviours in a manner that is aligned 
with  causally-relevant  contingencies  and  goal  states.  Behavioural 
competence (broadly construed) is, on our view, constitutively relevant to 
understanding.  
3 Note that while our notion of understanding in the individual case 
depends on the veridicality of explanatory and predictive inferences, the 
notion of shared understanding (to be developed later) does not necessarily 
entail  this  commitment  to  veridicality.  Two  or  more  individuals  could, 
theoretically,  share  an  understanding  even  if  that  understanding  was 
inaccurate or mistaken. The same cannot, it seems, be true of understanding 
in the individual case (an individual only understands something if their 
predictive inferences are veridical). This is one example where notions of 
understanding in the individual case do not appear to coincide with the 
notion of understanding in the shared case. That is, shared understanding 
does  not  appear  to  be  the  mere  sharing  of  individual  forms  of 
understanding.  
4 We suggest that an explicit knowledge of causal contingencies, such as 
might be required in formulating explanations of system behaviour, is not a 
prerequisite  of  understanding.  This  is  somewhat  controversial  because 
some might argue that explicit, linguistically-formulated explanations are a 
necessary  feature  of  understanding.  We  see  no  principled  reason  to 
motivate this conclusion. Understanding, on our view, simply requires an 
ability to exploit causal knowledge in order to adaptively regulate response 
output  in  goal-appropriate  ways.  In  some  cases  the  behavioural  outputs 
may  be  language-based,  but  non-linguistic  forms  of  behavioural  output 
seem equally valid. 
purpose and form, explanations of system functioning and 
observed  system  states,  and  predictions  of  future  system 
states‖ (pg. 351). Mental models therefore appear to play a 
key  role  in  enabling  understanding:  they  support  the 
generation of behaviours that warrant talk of an individual 
as understanding some aspect of a domain. 
In addition to mental models, it is important to consider how 
notions of understanding relate to the concept of SA and 
SSA. According to Endsley [6], SA is ―the perception of the 
elements in the environment within a volume of space and 
time, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection 
of their status in the near future‖ (pg. 36). Two elements of 
this definition seem immediately relevant to our notion of 
shared  understanding:  comprehension  and  projection. 
Comprehension implies that individuals who possess SA are 
capable  of  interpreting,  combining  and  prioritizing 
information.  Projection,  on  the  other  hand,  implies  that 
individuals  are  capable  of  formulating  expectations  about 
the occurrence of future events and system states. On the 
basis  of  Endsley‘s  [6]  characterization  it  would  therefore 
seem that understanding is something that is subsumed by 
SA  –  that  the  possession  of  SA  necessarily  entails 
understanding.  To  our  mind  this  does  not  seem  entirely 
appropriate. It seems that one could be aware of situation-
relevant information without necessarily understanding that 
information.  For  example,  one  could  be  aware  of  one  or 
more  items  of  information  without  necessarily  adjusting 
one‘s response output in goal-appropriate ways (i.e. ways 
that  ensure  the  efficient  realization  of  behavioural  and 
cognitive goals). SA, we suggest, might be better conceived 
of as the functional poise of situation-relevant information 
to  influence  thought  and  action  throughout  the  course  of 
online,  situation-directed  behaviour.  This  alternative 
conceptualization might achieve some degree of theoretical 
separation between the notions of SA and individual forms 
of understanding
5. 
3. SHARED UNDERSTANDING 
Based on the definition of understanding outlined above, we 
define shared understanding as follows: 
Shared understanding is the ability of multiple agents to 
exploit  common  bodies  of  causal  knowledge  for  the 
purpose of accomplishing common (or shared) goals.  
As  with  the  notion  of  individual  understanding,  shared 
understanding  entails  a  commitment  to  the  idea  that 
understanding is an ability; namely an ability to adaptively 
modify thought and action in ways that ensure the efficient 
realization  of  cognitive  and  behavioural  goals.  The  claim 
that common bodies of causal knowledge are exploited for 
the purposes of accomplishing common goals implies (but 
does  not  necessarily  entail)  that  the  cognitive  and 
behavioural  responses  of  agents  possessing  shared 
                                                            
5 Ultimately, the issue of whether SA can be studied independently of 
understanding is irrelevant. We assume that the notion of understanding is 
more generic than the notion of SA and that its ontological integrity does 
not depend on whether SA necessarily entails understanding.     
understanding will be highly similar (or at least functionally 
equivalent  with  regard  to  goal  realization
6). In fact,  we 
might conclude that similarity of response output is one way 
to measure the extent (or overlap) in  the  understanding 
possessed by  agents.  Thus,  two individuals who possess 
shared understanding will, at least in some cases,  establish 
the  same  set  of  explanations  and  expe ctations  given 
identical information about (e.g.) system states   (all other 
things being equal). I n the case of medical diagnosis,  for 
example, we might conclude that two individuals have the 
same  understanding  if  they  are  able  to  account  for 
symptoms in the same way, and are additionally able to 
anticipate the same set of pathophysiological outcomes as a 
result of disease progression. In a coalition military context 
we might say that two commanders have the same (i.e. 
shared) understanding of a  situation if   they are able to 
anticipate the same effects of military actions, and are also 
able to cite the same reasons as to why particular military 
actions should be undertaken (e.g. to ensure the efficient 
realization  of  mission  objectives).  Clearly,  the  shared 
understanding  that  individuals  possess  (as  measured  by 
predictive and explanatory capabilities) will not be identical 
in most cases. In addition, the shared understanding between 
individuals will rarely, if ever, be complete. More likely, 
individuals  will  p ossess  limited  forms  of  shared 
understanding that are specific to some situation or task 
context (see Section 5 for more on this). 
Although we have talked about sh ared understanding in 
terms of commonality of response outputs, it is important to 
be clear that we do not see commonality of response outputs 
as necessary for shared understanding. An alternative view 
of shared understanding, one that is commonly encountered 
in discussions regarding coalition operations, is that shared 
understanding entails an ability to coordinate the thoughts 
and  action  of  multiple  individuals  so  as  to   ensure  the 
efficient realization of some common or shared goal. This 
view  sees  shared  understanding  as   contributing  to 
something like unity of effort, the notion that coalition force 
elements (perhaps from different command  structures) are 
able to  cooperate and coordinate effectively in order to 
realize common mission objectives. Following on from this 
view, we might be inclined to define shared understanding 
as something like the following: 
Shared understanding is the ability of multiple agents to 
coordinate their behaviours with respect to each other 
in order to support the realization of common goals or 
                                                            
6 The notion of functional equivalence is included here to account for 
the fact that two more response outcomes may be equivalent with regard to 
the realization of specific goals. In these cases, it does not matter which 
response  is  selected  since  neither  is  better  or  worse  than  the  other. 
Differential  response  selection  in  these  cases  is  no  guide  to  the  actual 
similarity  of  understanding  possessed  by  agents,  because  agents  could 
possess the same understanding and yet select different responses using 
arbitrary criteria. One potential way round this problem is to suggest that 
what is important is not so much similarity of response choice as similarity 
of  response  generation.  Thus,  while  individuals  may  select  different 
(functionally equivalent) responses based (e.g.) on personal preferences, if 
they possess shared understanding they will nevertheless generate similar 
sets of response alternatives from which a selection is made.     
objectives. 
In this case, understanding does not imply commonality of 
response output, because each agent may have to undertake 
different actions in order to ensure that some common goal 
is  accomplished.  It  is  clear  that  when  common  goals  are 
being pursued, agents may sometimes need to adapt their 
response outputs in different ways based on an awareness of 
what other agents are currently doing. This is particularly 
true in  the case of  military  coalition operations, and it  is 
therefore  important  that  our  definition  of  shared 
understanding should not exclude this kind of coordinative 
function.  We  suggest  that  definitions  of  shared 
understanding should not oblige us to accept commonality 
of  response  output  as  a  necessary  condition  for  shared 
understanding. Rather, we should see shared understanding 
as an ability to adaptively modify behaviours in ways that 
ensure  collective  goals  are  accomplished.  In  some 
situations,  namely  those  in  which  collaboration  is  not 
required,  then  shared  understanding  will  be  indicated  by 
common  behaviours  (see  the  above  case  of  medical 
diagnosis).  In  other  cases,  shared  understanding  will  be 
indicated by an ability to engage in different (agent-specific) 
responses that are nevertheless coordinated with respect to 
each other. What is common to these two cases, we argue, is 
the ability of agents to exploit bodies of causal knowledge 
in order to adapt thought and action in ways that ensure the 
attainment of common goals. This is precisely the target of 
our  proposed  definition  of  shared  understanding.  The 
definition  does  not  limit  us  to  commonality  of  response 
output, although it is likely that in most cases commonality 
of response output will be the easiest means by which to 
measure shared understanding.  
As with understanding in the individual case, it is important 
to distinguish between shared understanding and ostensibly 
similar notions such as SMMs and SSA. SMMs [2, 3] are 
mental models that are possessed by multiple individuals. 
They  are  assumed  to  benefit  team  coordination  and 
communication  because  they  enable  individuals  to 
anticipate  one  another‘s  information  requirements  and 
interpret events in similar or identical ways. Inasmuch as 
mental models provide a realizing mechanism for individual 
forms of understanding (see Section 2), it is possible that 
SMM  may provide one  means by  which shared forms  of 
understanding may be realized. Nothing in our definition of 
shared understanding, however, commits us to the idea that 
individuals must have similar or identical mental models in 
order to possess shared understanding
7. In fact, we maintain 
that, at least in some cases, the actual details of the physical 
mechanisms that  realize  shared understanding  are  largely 
irrelevant in terms of our efforts to delineate the relationship 
between  shared  understanding  and  group 
interaction/coordination processes. In other words, it does 
not matter how individuals manage to realize the behaviours 
that warrant the ascription of understanding; what matters 
are the behavioural outputs themselves. Something like this 
                                                            
7 This aligns itself, to some extent, with the notion of equifinality that is 
discussed in the SMM literature [see 7].  
conclusion is also apparent in the SMM literature. Cannon-
Bowers et al [3] thus argue that because the ―function or 
benefit of shared mental models is that they lead to common 
expectations  of  the  task  and  team,  it  is  the  expectations 
rather  than  the  mental  models  themselves  that  must  be 
shared‖. 
Understanding  the  relationship  between  shared 
understanding and SSA is somewhat more difficult than is 
the case for shared understanding and SMMs. This is partly 
because the notion of SSA includes the same elements of 
comprehension and projection that proved so problematic in 
the case of individual SA [8-10] (see Section 2). As with 
individual SA, it may be necessary to discriminate between 
a shared awareness of situation-relevant information and the 
common (e.g.) predictive and retrodictive capabilities that 
constitute shared understanding. 
4. MACHINE UNDERSTANDING 
The notion of shared understanding  that  we developed in 
Section  3  implies  that  multiple  individuals  (or  agents) 
possess similar (or identical) abilities when it comes to (e.g.) 
the prediction and explanation of (e.g.) system behaviour. 
This  view  does  not  entail  a  commitment  to  the  idea  that 
similar mechanisms need to undergird the manifestation of 
these  abilities.  Different  agents  could  use  very  different 
mechanisms  to  generate  explanations  and  predictions 
without  necessarily  undermining  the  possibility  that  they 
possess shared understanding. All that is required for shared 
understanding, in our view, is an ability to adapt response 
output with respect to bodies of causal knowledge in ways 
that  lead  to  the  realization  of  shared  goals.  We  therefore 
embrace a functionalist view of shared understanding. We 
allow  for  the  possibility  that  shared  understanding  is 
independent of the specific details associated with realizing 
mechanisms.  Given  these  functionalist  intuitions  about 
shared understanding, we suggest that machine agents can 
possess  understanding,  and  that  they  can  share  their 
understanding with other agents. 
One  of  the  major  objections  to  the  notion  of  machine 
understanding  derives  from  the  philosophical  community. 
Searle‘s [11]  famous case  of the Chinese room tends to 
undermine  the  idea  that  computational  operations  defined 
across  formally  specified  elements  can  yield  the  kind  of 
understanding that characterizes biologically-circumscribed 
cognition.  Searle‘s  [11]  thought  experiment  has  been  the 
subject  of  a  lively  debate  about  the  tenability  of  formal 
accounts to yield genuinely intelligent behaviour; however, 
it is not our purpose, in this paper, to refute or rebut Searle‘s 
argument.  Instead,  we  suggest  that  in  concluding  that  no 
amount of formal syntactic manipulation could (ever) yield 
genuine understanding, some theorists may have relied too 
much on an overly simplistic (and poorly defined) notion of 
what  understanding  really  means.  The  notion  of 
understanding,  as  discussed  by  Searle  [11],  does  not,  we 
suggest, correspond to the notion of understanding that is 
presented here. And arguments against formal, information-
theoretic formulations of machine understanding thus gain 
little or no leverage with respect to the present discussion. 
The  logic  of  Searle‘s  [11]  argument  seems  to  be  that 
understanding consists in something more than an ability to 
engage  in  adaptive  sequences  of  goal-relevant  response 
output.  This  additional  feature  is,  we  suggest,  perhaps 
something  akin  to  the  phenomenal  experience  of 
understanding  –  the  conscious  experiences  we  have 
whenever  we  ‗feel‘  as  though  we  understand  something. 
Given this apparent emphasis on phenomenal experience, it 
is not surprising that formal systems (at least of the kind 
described by Searle) seem unlikely to possess any kind of 
understanding.  The  problem  is  that  we  do  not  accept  the 
claim that conscious experiences are indeed constitutively 
relevant to understanding (at least the form of understanding 
that is being discussed here). There are two reasons for this
8. 
Firstly,  human  subjects  may  feel  that  they  understand 
something, even though they may be mistaken. Secondly, it 
seems that we may, on occasion, understand something even 
when the conscious feelings associated with understanding 
are lacking
9. One (admittedly theoretical) example of this is 
Price‘s [12] account of why we find it so hard to accept that 
we have some understanding of consciousness in spite of 
the fact that we do seem to have access to a significant body 
of  explanatorily-relevant  information  (consider  the  wealth 
of  knowledge  derived  from  neuroscientific  and 
neuropsychological analyses). What Price [12] suggests is 
that our problems in  understanding consciousness are  not 
attributable  to  the  ontological  or  metaphysical  profile  of 
phenomenal experience per se; rather, the problem is rooted 
in how the feelings of understanding are generated in the 
first place. The ―warm glow of explanatory understanding‖, 
Price [12] suggests is the result of a kind of self-deception in 
which  we  fool  ourselves  into  seeing  effects  as  contained 
within  their  causes  [see  also  13].  The  point,  for  present 
purposes, is simply that our conscious feelings regarding the 
depth of our understanding are generally poor guides as to 
our actual level of understanding in some domain. Inasmuch 
as  Searle‘s  [11]  claims  are  based  on  the  idea  that 
phenomenal experience is a necessary part of understanding, 
we suggest that such claims cannot establish the case against 
machine understanding. Synthetic agents could, we suggest, 
engage  in  behaviours  that  warrant  talk  of  them  as 
legitimately  understanding  some  state  of  affairs.  We  also 
suggest that inasmuch as these behaviours (e.g. predictions 
about  future  events)  parallel  those  made  by  other  agents 
(including  human  agents)  then  such  agents  (human  and 
machine)  should  be  considered  as  possessing  shared 
understanding relative to each other. 
                                                            
8 Potentially, a third reason exists. It is that while multiple individuals 
seem capable of expressing the same cognitive, behavioural and linguistic 
competencies (as is the case in our notion of shared understanding), it is 
less clear that they can share conscious experiences. If we conclude that 
‗feelings‘ are of constitutive relevance to understanding then the possibility 
that  we  can  ever  encounter  genuine  forms  of  shared  understanding  (in 
which the same conscious experience must be shared) seems problematic. 
9 There is, of course, an additional argument here. It is that, even in the 
human case, we may encounter forms of implicit understanding that do not 
necessarily entail conscious experiences.  
5. SHARING UNDERSTANDING 
As Cannon-Bowers and Salas [14] point out in the context 
of  shared  cognition,  the  notion  of  ‗sharedness‘  can  be 
viewed in multiple ways. One interpretation of ‗shared‘ is 
that  it  denotes  the  common  or  joint  possession  of  some 
resource (e.g. the sharing of a belief or item of equipment). 
An alternative view sees ‗sharing‘ as implying the division 
of a resource between multiple recipients (e.g. sharing the 
workload  or  sharing  a  dessert).  The  former  view  of 
sharedness  is  clearly  the  one  that  is  most  relevant  to  the 
notion of shared understanding as discussed in this paper. 
On our view, shared understanding is the possession of a 
single  resource  (i.e.  an  ability),  and  that  resource  is  not 
divided  into  parts  and  distributed  across  multiple  agents. 
Perhaps there are some situations, however, in which it does 
make sense to talk about understanding as being shared in 
the distributed sense of the term. Perhaps, in such situations, 
it is collections of individuals that possess understanding, 
not individuals themselves.  
In this section we attempt to present a variety of views of 
understanding, each of which differs with respect to the way 
in  which  the  abilities  that  constitute  understanding  are 
distributed  among  a  variety  of  processing  elements  and 
material resources.  
5.1. Identical Understanding 
One view of shared understanding emphasizes the need for 
agents  to  possess  identical  abilities.  This  form  of  shared 
understanding assumes that the understanding possessed by 
one or more agents is completely overlapping. Two or more 
individuals  possess  shared  understanding  when  they  have 
exactly  the  same  kind  of  understanding,  relative  to  a 
particular  task  context  or  epistemic  domain.  We  might 
expect  to  see  this  kind  of  understanding  in  cases  where 
individuals  have  exactly  the  same  role  with  respect  to  a 
given task. Note that this view of understanding does not 
require agents to possess the same understanding across all 
domains and tasks; it simply requires them to have the same 
understanding within a particular domain or task. 
5.2. Similar Understanding 
Unlike  complete  understanding,  the  notion  of  similar 
understanding does not assume that two or more individuals 
need to have identical forms of understanding. Instead, what 
is  deemed  important  is  similarity  of  abilities.  Individuals 
who  have  high  levels  of  shared  understanding  will  have 
similar  abilities when it comes to some task, but differences 
in both the scope (e.g. coverage of particular domains) and 
depth of understanding present an upper limit on the degree 
of  overlap  in  understanding.  This  view  of  shared 
understanding is likely to be the most suitable for real-world 
environments. It treats shared understanding as a variable 
quantity –  something that can exist to a  greater or lesser 
extent. 
5.3. Complementary Understanding 
In some situations it may not be necessary for agents to have 
identical, or even similar, abilities in order to successfully 
contribute  to  collaborative  tasks.  What  might  be  required 
instead  is  an  understanding  that  is  complementary  or 
compatible to whatever understanding is possessed by other 
group  members.  One  might  expect  to  see  this  form  of 
understanding  in  teams  featuring  a  high  degree  of  role 
specialization (where individual team members are required 
to perform specialized tasks that are not shared with other 
team members). It is not compulsory to treat complementary 
understanding as a form of shared understanding; however, 
it may be regarded as such if we interpret ‗shared‘ to mean 
the  distribution  of  understanding  across  multiple  group 
members.  If  we  do  this,  however,  it  becomes  somewhat 
difficult  to  distinguish  complementary  forms  of 
understanding from distributed forms of understanding (see 
Section  5.4).  As  such,  the  status  of  complementary  or 
compatible forms of understanding is currently unclear. 
5.4. Distributed Understanding 
In  Section  4  it  was  suggested  that  our  notions  of  shared 
understanding should be guided by functionalist intuitions. 
We  should  not,  it  was  suggested,  commit  ourselves  to  a 
view  that  accords  special  significance  to  one  particular 
mechanistic realization of understanding (e.g. a neural one). 
Rather,  we  should  allow  for  the  possibility  that  multiple 
mechanisms may contribute to the expression of behaviours 
warranting  talk  of  an  agent  as  understanding  some  target 
domain  of  discourse.  It  was  this  commitment  to  a 
functionalist  viewpoint  that  enabled  us  to  see  machine 
agents as capable of understanding (see Section 4). In this 
section,  we  develop  these  functionalist  intuitions  further. 
We  suggest  that  by  allowing  notions  of  understanding  to 
‗float  free‘  of  the  specific  details  of  physical 
implementation, we can adopt a view of understanding that 
sees it as (at least potentially) grounded in processing loops 
that extend beyond the boundaries of individual agents  to 
incorporate elements of the broader social and technological 
environment. 
To make this idea somewhat more concrete, imagine two 
teams  of  human  subjects  each  engaged  in  a  task  that 
requires the explanation and prediction of system states. For 
the sake of argument, let us say that the target system (the 
one whose behaviour is being explained and predicted by 
the teams) is the behaviour of a specific tribal group in a 
military  conflict  zone.  We  assume  that  predictive  and 
explanatory  success  in  this  domain  depends  on  the 
availability of large and heterogeneous bodies of specialist 
knowledge  (perhaps  subtending  disciplines  as  diverse  as 
cultural anthropology, psychology, history, sociology and so 
on), and it is therefore necessary for the two teams to be 
composed  of  experts  from  multiple  disciplines.  The 
objective  of  each  team  is  to  use  the  expertise  of  team 
members  in  order  to  support  the  generation  of  reliable 
predictions and explanations regarding tribal behaviour. To 
the extent that the teams generate similar explanations and 
predictions,  we  may  conclude  that  they  (i.e.  the  teams)  
possess  shared  understanding  of  the  target  domain
10. But 
note that within each team the mechanisms that contribute to 
understanding are essentially distributed; the mechanisms 
undergirding explanatorily-  and predictively-potent (team-
level) outcomes are realized by processing loops that extend 
across all team members. It is in precisely this way that 
understanding (or at least the mechanisms that contribute to 
understanding)  can  be  d istributed.  Specific  individuals 
within a team need not understand a complex system in 
order for team-level understanding to emerge, and it may 
even be the case that shared understanding between team 
members is somewhat limited  – each member may possess 
unique bodies of expertise and knowledge that is not shared 
with other members of the same team. What is important to 
note  here  is  that  the  mechanisms  that  contribute  to 
understanding  need  not  be  localized  to  the  heads  of 
individual human agents; instead, they may extend across a 
variety  of  biological  and  (sometimes)  non-biological 
resources.  In  addition,  the  system  that  does  the 
understanding may not necessarily be an individual human 
agent; instead, it may sometimes be a collection of (often) 
heterogeneous elements comprising multiple human agents, 
intelligent  software  systems,  networked  information 
resources and other technological artefacts. 
Analogues to this distributed approach to understanding are 
apparent  in  the  literature  on  SMMs.  A  core  claim  in  the 
SMMs literature is that greater inter-individual similarity of 
mental models leads to greater similarity in the expectations 
and explanations generated by individuals. This, in turn, is 
seen to result in improved coordination, communication and 
other team behaviours [4]. Differences in mental models are 
expected  to  result  in  differences  in  expectations  and 
explanations.  Thus,  the  best  way  to  ensure  optimal  team 
performance is to ensure that individuals possess the same 
mental models. In contrast to this view, Banks and Millward 
[15] suggest that individuals do not need to share mental 
models  (at  least  in  the  sense  that  individuals  possess 
multiple  similar  models).  Instead  they  propose  that  the 
cognitive process of running a mental model can be divided 
or distributed amongst team members. One benefit of this 
approach,  they  argue,  is  that  it  avoids  the  need  for  team 
members  to  possess  redundant  bodies  of  knowledge.  By 
distributing  the  workload  for  running  the  mental  model, 
team members effectively spread the load imposed on the 
group; they essentially avoid the effort and work required 
for  individuals  to  assimilate,  maintain  and  execute  full 
mental models of the target system [see 16, 17]. 
6. ISSUES FOR SHARED UNDERSTANDING 
RESEARCH WITHIN COALITION CONTEXTS 
The  majority  of  this  paper  has  been  devoted  to  the 
                                                            
10  Similarity  of  response  output  is  sufficient  for  conclusions  about 
shared understanding in this case because we assume no interdependence 
between the teams with respect to the accomplishment of particular goals. 
Although similarity of response output may be sufficient for conclusions 
about  shared  understanding  in  cases  such  as  these  we  maintain  that 
similarity of response output is not necessary for two or more agents to 
possess shared understanding (see Section 3 for more on this).  
derivation  of  definitions  for  the  notions  of  understanding 
and shared understanding. The current section seeks to raise 
some specific questions that should be addressed by future 
research  aimed  at  improving  shared  understanding  in 
military coalition contexts. 
6.1. Who (or what) shares the understanding? 
We saw that our notion of shared understanding makes no 
commitment about the nature of realizing mechanisms (two 
agents  could  possess  the  same  or  similar  understanding 
without  using  the  same  mechanisms).  What  implication 
does this have for our notions of who (or what) is deemed to 
possess shared understanding? Must it always be the case 
that  notions  of  shared  understanding  are  developed  with 
regard  to  individual  human  agents,  or  can  collections  of 
human (and perhaps machine) agents also manifest shared 
understanding? 
Besides  the  question  of  whether  shared  understanding  is 
something  possessed  by  individuals,  groups  or  machine 
entities,  there  is  also  the  question  of  who  should  share 
understanding in particular task contexts. Military coalitions 
have complex group structures and group dynamics. Small 
ad  hoc  teams  may  be  assembled  in  response  to  specific 
challenges,  and  large  scale  operations  may  necessitate 
complex  patterns  of  inter-team  coordination  and 
collaboration. Such complexity raises questions about how 
we  should  identify  which  subset  of  individuals  needs  to 
possess  shared  understanding,  and  what  kind  of  shared 
understanding (e.g. scope and depth) they should possess. 
6.2. What is the value of shared understanding? 
A key question for future research in coalition contexts is 
the  relationship  between  shared  understanding  and  group 
performance  outcomes.  Shared  understanding  may  be 
important for the accuracy, quality, volume and timeliness 
of task outcomes, and future research should clearly aim to 
explore  this  possibility.  Another  effect  of  shared 
understanding may be to enhance team processes or team 
behaviours.  For  example,  shared  understanding  may 
improve inter-agent communication, enabling both  human 
and  synthetic  agents  to  anticipate  the  information 
requirements of teammates and provide them with advance 
information. This ability to proactively provide information 
in  advance  of  its  actual  use  has  been  identified  as  a  key 
aspect  of  team  effectiveness  [18,  19]
11.  Shared 
understanding  may  al so  improve  the  efficiency  of 
communication  or  reduce  the  need  for  communication 
altogether. This can be useful in terms of reducing the 
burden on communication systems that may be limited in 
terms of their available bandwidth and power. Finally, it is 
possible that greater levels of shared understanding may 
deliver a number of beneficial ‗psychoaffective‘ outcomes. 
These could include things such as improved morale, trust 
and team satisfaction. 
                                                            
11 For example, Oser et al [19] found that the teamwork behaviour of 
‗offering  information  before  it  was  requested‘  was  related  to  team 
effectiveness in military command and control teams.  
6.3. Is shared understanding always desirable? 
Even  if  shared  understanding  can  be  found  to  exert  a 
positive effect on performance in some situations, it is by no 
means  clear  that  we  should  strive  to  enhance  shared 
understanding  in  every  situation.  There  are  clearly  some 
situations in which shared understanding will be difficult to 
establish (e.g.  multi-disciplinary teams of experts that are 
brought  together  to  collaboratively  resolve  a  complex 
problem).  Moreover,  in  some  situations  shared 
understanding may stifle creativity or contribute to negative 
group behaviours such as groupthink [20]. 
6.4. What factors contribute to shared understanding? 
Inasmuch  as  SMMs  can  be  considered  as  one  of  the 
realizing mechanisms for shared understanding then some of 
the  interventions  that  have  been  proposed  to  foster  the 
development of SMM may be important in the search for 
ways to enhance shared understanding  [18, 21]. It should be 
remembered, however, that many of these interventions are 
based on small-team situations and they may not be suitable 
for the kind of environments in which coalition operations 
are  typically  undertaken.  In  addition,  coalition  operations 
feature a diversity of groups differing with respect to factors 
such  as  entitativity,  permeability,  size,  culture  and 
opportunities  for  interpersonal  (face-to-face)  interaction. 
This  suggests  that  the  factors  contributing  to  shared 
understanding  may  be  highly  heterogeneous,  and  that 
interventions aimed at enhancing shared understanding will 
need  to  consider  the  nature  of  groups,  as  well  as  the 
dynamics of inter-group interaction. 
6.5. What kind of understanding is required? 
The kind of understanding that needs to be shared by two or 
more agents will vary depending on the nature of the tasks 
in which the agents participate, as well as the nature of the 
agents  themselves  (e.g.  whether  they  are  all  humans, 
software  agents  or  some  mixture  of  the  two)  [22].  For 
example,  shared  understanding  may  target  aspects  of  a 
particular situation, the dynamics of team interaction or the 
strategies that need to be pursued in order to realize task 
goals.  Research thus needs to be sensitive  to the  kind of 
understanding that is required in particular situations.  
It should also be remembered that multiple forms of shared 
understanding may be conceptualized (see Section 5), and 
that  not  all  these  forms  of  shared  understanding  require 
agents  to  posses  similar  or overlapping  abilities.  In  some 
task  contexts,  it  may  make  more  sense  to  adopt  a  more 
distributed perspective with respect to shared understanding 
(see Section 5.4).  
6.6. How should shared understanding be measured? 
It  has  not  been  the  purpose  of  this  paper  to  consider 
approaches  to  the  measurement  of  shared  understanding; 
nevertheless, any scientific progress on the issue of shared 
understanding  obviously  requires  reliable  measurement 
techniques.  Given  our  ability-based  definition  of 
understanding  and  shared  understanding,  the 
operationalization  and  measurement  of  shared 
understanding needs to focus on the kind of responses that 
are  made  by  subjects.  In  some  situations  it  may  be 
appropriate  to  regard  similarity  of  response  output  as 
indicative  of  shared  understanding,  although,  as  noted  in 
Section 3, similarity of response output is not required for 
shared understanding. 
Since  SMM  may  constitute  one  means  by  which  shared 
understanding  is  realized,  the  kind  of  techniques  used  to 
measure  SMMs  may  have  some  validity  in  measuring 
shared understanding
12. The validity of these techniques will 
ultimately be based on the extent to which  the similarity of 
inter-individual mental models predicts the level of shared 
understanding  between those individuals. Since this still 
requires some independent measure of shared understanding 
to be formulated,  SMM approaches are only likely to be 
worthwhile  if  they  are  easier  or  more  cost -effective  to 
deploy than  alternative approaches to the measurement of 
shared understanding.  
Some of the techniques used to measure team knowledge 
[24] and situation awareness [8, 25, 26] may also be useful 
in the further scientific exploration of shared understanding. 
7. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have sought to explore a number of issues 
associated  with  the  notion  of  shared  understanding, 
specifically  in  relation  to  military  coalition  operations.  A 
primary aim of the paper has been to clarify what is meant 
by  the  terms  ‗understanding‘  and  ‗shared  understanding‘, 
and  we  have  sought  to  formulate  definitions  for  each  of 
these  terms  in  ways  that  (hopefully)  assists  with  future 
empirical studies. Our proposed definition for understanding 
(i.e.  individual  understanding)  emphasizes  the  ability  of 
agents to exploit bodies of causal knowledge. In order to 
understand, we suggest, agents need to be able to exploit 
causal knowledge in order to adapt response output in goal-
relevant ways (i.e. ways that ensure the efficient realization 
of cognitive and behavioural goals). The main manifestation 
of this ability (at least in the human case) is the ability to 
formulate expectations and explanations regarding the part 
of the world to which understanding applies (i.e. the domain 
of  understanding).  Thus  in  the  case  of  understanding  a 
complex  system  (perhaps  another  human  agent), 
understanding  is  apparent  when  we  are  able  to  reliably 
predict  future  states  (e.g.  behavioural  outcomes)  and 
account  for  such  states  in  terms  of  causally-significant 
forces and factors (e.g. the causal role of mental states with 
respect  to  the  expression  of  overt  behaviour).  Such 
predictive and explanatory behaviour is an example of how 
we  are  able  to  exploit  causal  knowledge  in  order  to 
accomplish specific goals (e.g. reliably predict behaviour). 
Having  proposed  a  definition  for  understanding,  we 
suggested  that  shared  understanding  is  the  ability  of 
                                                            
12 Shared mental models are typically operationalized as the correlation 
between link-weighted networks using Pathfinder analysis [23].  
multiple  agents  to  exploit  common  bodies  of  causal 
knowledge for the purpose of accomplishing common (or 
shared)  goals.  Our  notion  of  shared  understanding 
emphasizes the way in which two or more agents are able to 
use  causal  knowledge  to  guide  thought  and  action  in 
common ways. Thus shared understanding will be apparent 
whenever  two  or  more  agents  are  able  to  use  causal 
knowledge to generate similar explanations and predictions. 
In the case of understanding intentional action, two agents 
may be said to have a shared understanding if they are able 
to  make  the  same  actual  (and  counterfactual)  predictions 
concerning overt behaviour, and they are additionally able 
to  formulate  similar  explanations  (e.g.  in  terms  of  the 
possession  of  particular  mental  states)  as  to  why  such 
predictions  respect  the  ‗causal  logic‘  of  the  domain  in 
question. 
Both  of  the  definitions  that  we  have  proposed  see 
understanding  as  a  kind  of  ability  –  a  way  to  exploit 
information and knowledge in order to realize cognitive and 
behavioural goals. In part, this definition is inspired by our 
experience  of  the  way  in  which  shared  understanding  is 
deemed to influence coalition military effectiveness. Thus in 
talking about coalition operations, shared understanding is 
often cited as a factor that enables coalition force elements 
(perhaps from different command structures) to adaptively 
coordinate their collective behaviours in order to accomplish 
common mission objectives (Maj. Edward Gentle, personal 
communication).  It  seems  that  some  sort  of  predictive 
ability  (perhaps  of  the  situation,  group  behaviour,  or 
commander  decision-making)  must  underpin  this 
coordinative ability. Thus it is only when force elements are 
able  to  anticipate  the  behaviour  of  other  elements,  and 
predict the effects of actions on the environment, that they 
are  able  to  coordinate  (or  synchronize)  their  collective 
actions in support of common goals
13.  
Inasmuch  as  shared  understanding  contributes  to  the 
deployment  of   efficient  modes  of  inter -agent 
communication and coordination, it  may  have particular 
value in the context of coalition operations. This is because 
coalition  environments  are  often  resource  constrained 
environments in which power overheads and network traffic 
must  be  kept  to  a  minimum.  If  s hared  understanding 
improves  the  efficiency  of  inter -agent  communication 
(perhaps reducing the need for communication altogether), 
it may optimize the use of limited network resources. In 
addition,  shared  understanding  may  enable  coalition 
members  to  antic ipate  one  another‘s  information 
requirements  and  thereby  optimize  the  distribution  of 
information  within  a  network  environment  (i.e.  sending 
information to the right place at the right time). This ability 
to proactively provide information in advance of its actual 
use  has  been  shown  to  improve  team  effectiveness  in 
empirical studies [18, 19], and it is also a major focus of 
research efforts in the synthetic agent community [27, 28]. 
                                                            
13  Obviously  much  may  also  depend  on  the  extent  to  which  force 
elements have an awareness of what other force  elements are currently 
doing. 
In  conclusion,  shared  understanding  emerges  as  a 
potentially  important  construct  in  enhancing  coalition 
effectiveness.  A  number  of  problems  with  past  coalition 
operations  have  been  attributed  to  breakdowns  in  shared 
understanding  (e.g.  Operation  Anaconda),  and  shared 
understanding  is  typically  cited  as  a  desirable  feature  of 
coalition  operations.  Moreover,  major  defence-related 
research programmes, such as the International Technology 
Alliance
14 (ITA), have identified shared understanding as a 
hard problem for future coalition operations. In light of this, 
it is important that the scientific community should strive to 
generate  definitions  of  shared  understanding  and  posit 
empirically testable hypotheses that can be used to guide 
future research. This paper constitutes an initial step in the 
direction of this goal. It has proposed a specific defi nition 
for  shared  understanding  and   identified  a  number  of  
challenges for future research . The work presented here 
will, we hope, serve to stimulate theoretical debate and 
guide empirical research regarding the nature  and value of 
shared understanding in military coalition environments. 
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